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Why Can’t Discrimination Be Discrimination?  
Johnson v. K Mart Corp. and the  
Meaning of “Discrimination” Under the  
Americans with Disabilities Act 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In March of 1994, Ms. Helen Weyer “became unable to work 
because of severe depression” and has remained “totally disabled” since 
that time.1 She began receiving disability benefits (payments in lieu of 
salary)2 from a group long-term disability (LTD) plan in which she had 
enrolled through her employer.3 After two years, however, those benefits 
ceased because her LTD plan classified her disability as a mental illness. 
Under the group plan, individuals with physical disabilities were able to 
receive benefits until age sixty-five, while mental disabilities had a 
twenty-four-month cap.4 Weyer filed suit against her employer, claiming 
that the disparity in coverage of mental and physical disabilities under 
the LTD plan was discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA). Her claim failed because, according to the Ninth Circuit, the 
ADA did not prohibit this type of discrimination.5
At about the same time, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) filed two separate suits. One was for a person who, 
due to a panic disorder, had become eligible for LTD benefits in 1992 
and then received a letter two years later stating that the benefits had 
been terminated “pursuant to the two-year limitation” for “‘mental or 
 1. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 2. A long-term disability (LTD) plan gives recipients payments in lieu of salary if their 
disability makes them unable to work. 
 3. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1107. 
 4. Id. at 1107–08. 
 5. The Ninth Circuit explained that “insurance distinctions that apply equally to all 
employees cannot be discriminatory.” Id. at 1116. Though disparate LTD plans may not be 
discrimination under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the ADA, discrimination does have a 
broader meaning, which includes the “effect of a law or established practice that confers privileges 
on a certain class or that denies privileges to a certain class” or a “[d]ifferential treatment” where “no 
reasonable distinction can be found.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 479 (7th ed. 1999). On a broader 
level, the term simply means the act of making a distinction. See infra text accompanying notes 48–
51. 
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emotional conditions.’”6 The other suit was for a person (and twenty-
seven “similarly situated individuals”) who had become “unable to work 
because of major depression and anxiety” and who had been denied all 
LTD benefits after eighteen months because of a time limit placed on 
mental disability benefits.7 Like Weyer, these plaintiffs were 
unsuccessful in establishing discrimination claims under the ADA.8
Modern managed care systems have consistently contained “greater 
restrictions and limitations for mental illness than for physical illness.”9 
While managed care continues to limit coverage for mental disabilities, 
mental illness and the disabilities associated with it are becoming more 
prevalent. Recent studies have indicated that “[t]he leading cause of 
hospital admissions nationwide is psychiatric illness”10 and that “one out 
of every two Americans alive today will suffer from a mental illness at 
some point in her lifetime.”11 But as the need for mental health services 
has increased, the insurance companies’ willingness to cover the costs 
has decreased. Weyer noted that in the context of LTD plans, policies 
without a time limit on mental disabilities were “rare in the industry and 
more expensive because of the increased risk.”12
 6. EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting the relevant 
language of the LTD plan). 
 7. Id. at 146–47 (consolidating EEOC v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 1998 WL 851605 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998), with Staten Island Sav. Bank). 
 8. Id. at 149 (“[T]he complainants here enjoyed access to exactly the same benefit plans as 
did their physically disabled and non-disabled coworkers.”). 
 9. C. Geoffrey Weirich & Ashoo K. Sharma, Tracking the Path to Parity Between Mental 
and Physical Health Benefits, 17 LAB. LAW. 469, 470 (2002) (citing Brian D. Shannon, The Brain 
Gets Sick, Too—The Case for Equal Insurance Coverage for Serious Mental Illness, 24 ST. MARY’S 
L.J. 365, 370 (1993)). These restrictions have included “shorter duration of hospitalization and 
imposed lower annual or lifetime maximum coverage,” id., and other limitations, such as 
capping benefits at arbitrary, and often very low levels, on a per-treatment basis, an 
annual basis or through lifetime limits; requiring insurers to pay a high deductible; i.e., to 
make a major out-of-pocket investment before services are reimbursed; [and] requiring 
high co-payments by policyholders, e.g., limiting reimbursement to 50% of actual costs. 
Shannon, supra, at 370 n.21 (quoting ANNE M. O’KEEFE, NATIONAL ALLIANCE FOR THE MENTALLY 
ILL, ADVOCATING FOR INSURANCE REFORM 13–14 (1991)). 
 10. Weirich & Sharma, supra note 9, at 469 (citation omitted). 
 11. Id. (citing Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General, U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs. (1999), at http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/mentalhealth/home. 
htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2003)). 
 12. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000). Most 
insurance and benefit plan providers justify the industry’s standards with cost-containment problems 
that parity between services would create due to the unique “consumer behavior” that accompanies 
many mental services. Maggie D. Gold, Must Insurers Treat All Illnesses Equally?—Mental vs. 
Physical Illness: Congressional and Administrative Failure to End Limitations to and Exclusions 
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The battle over mental health coverage is being waged on many 
fronts. For example, in 1996, proponents of parity pushed the Mental 
Health Parity Act (MHPA)13 through Congress. Additionally, scholars 
have attempted to demonstrate the misleading nature of distinctions 
between mental and physical diseases and disabilities.14 In the courts, the 
EEOC and other organizations have challenged disparate plans under the 
ADA. On the other side, insurance companies and their lobbyists have 
been fighting to create loopholes in disability statute mandates. They 
have lobbied diligently for provisions that have weakened the ADA and 
MHPA.15
A large portion of the battle in the courts has been waged against 
disparate LTD plans like the one that affected Weyer. Until Johnson v. K 
from Coverage for Mental Illness in Employer-Provided Health Benefits Under the Mental Health 
Parity Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 767, 773–74 (1997–1998). 
There are basically “two consumer behavior related cost bases for [a] more restricted coverage for 
mental illness: moral hazard and adverse selection.” Id. at 774. Generally speaking, moral hazard 
defines the problem of a “higher demand” being directly related to a lower “out-of-pocket price.” Id. 
Scholars have argued that “demand for mental health services has been shown to be highly 
responsive to the presence or absence of insurance coverage” partially because “some forms of 
treatment . . . [are] similar to nonprofessional forms of human support and interaction.” Id. (citing 
James E. Sabin & Norman Daniels, Determining “Medical Necessity” in Mental Health Practice, 
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.–Dec. 1994, at 5, 10). Gold explains that “[t]he basic premise of 
this . . . argument is that mental illness has vague end points, severe diagnostic ambiguity and more 
uncertain and less efficacious treatment than other areas of physical medicine—creating 
considerable moral hazard.” Id. “Adverse selection” deals with a fear that those plans that “offer 
substantially higher mental health benefits . . . will disproportionately attract higher cost 
populations,” and that the “increased number of high risk enrollees raises costs,” and will result in 
“either a reduction in coverage or an increase in premium cost.” Id. at 775. This second problem 
seems somewhat contrived because if all plans are required to provide equal coverage to mental and 
physical treatments, then the problem disappears. See id. at 775 n.31. 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(a) (2000). MHPA requires “lifetime dollar limits for mental health 
coverage to be the same as for physical health coverage in group health plans,” requiring plans to 
either have the same limits for both medical/surgical conditions and mental conditions or different 
limits where the limits for mental health services “are no more restrictive than those for 
medical/surgical services.” See Gold, supra note 12, at 782–83. The MHPA, however, does not 
apply to LTD plans because LTD plans do not involve treatment of mental or physical disabilities 
but are rather payments in lieu of salary. See generally Weirich & Sharma, supra note 9. 
 14. See Shannon, supra note 9, at 367 (illustrating the “inconsistencies between medical 
research and insurance coverage for serious mental illnesses”); Weirich & Sharma, supra note 9, at 
476–77 (illustrating the overlap between physical and mental illnesses by examining the struggle 
courts have had in determining whether a specific disease was mental or physical for the purpose of 
insurance coverage). 
 15. See Gold, supra note 12, at 779–94 (analyzing the effects and defects of the ADA and 
MHPA). 
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Mart Corp.,16 the circuit courts had unanimously upheld these plans, 
finding that such disparity did not amount to discrimination under Title I 
of the ADA.17 Though courts addressing this issue must address other 
legal obstacles before determining the validity of disparate LTD plans 
under Title I,18 the question of disparate treatment of physical and mental 
 16. 273 F.3d 1035 (11th Cir.) (panel), reh’g en banc granted, panel opinion vacated 273 F.3d 
at 1070 (11th Cir. 2001). The procedural posture of Johnson is peculiar because of the way in which 
the court addressed the issue of whether former employees are eligible to file suit under Title I of the 
ADA. See infra note 18. The Eleventh Circuit had already held that former employees are not 
eligible to file suit under Title I. See Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523 (11th Cir. 
1996). The Johnson court held, over a strong dissent, that a recent Supreme Court ruling required the 
court to reconsider the ruling in Gonzales. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1038 (citing Robinson v. Shell Oil 
Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997)). Because Robinson was not exactly on point (a Title VII case) and 
Gonzales may have been decided with the input of earlier decisions similar to Robinson, it is 
questionable as to whether a three-judge panel could overrule Gonzales. See Johnson, 273 F.3d at 
1066 (Carnes, J., dissenting) (“The prior panel precedent rule is an essential principle, the number 
one ground rule, by which all of us in this Court must abide.”); United States v. Steele, 147 F.3d 
1316, 1317–18 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“Under our prior precedent rule, a panel cannot overrule 
a prior one’s holding even though convinced it is wrong.” (quoting Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 
1386 (11th Cir. 1997))). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit in Johnson granted a rehearing en banc and 
vacated the panel ruling. In the interim, however, Kmart filed bankruptcy and the Eleventh Circuit 
withheld rendering a decision “in compliance with 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1).” Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 
281 F.3d 1368, 1368 (11th Cir. 2002). Though the Johnson ruling has been vacated for a rehearing 
and that rehearing has been stayed, the Johnson decision remains the most recent analysis of 
disparate LTD coverage under the discrimination standard of the ADA. 
 17. See EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 149–50 (2d Cir. 2000); Weyer v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1112 (9th Cir. 2000); Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 
196 F.3d 1092 (10th Cir. 1999); Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166 (4th Cir. 1999); Ford v. 
Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 18. Challengers to the validity of disparate LTD plans under Title I of the ADA must 
overcome two other obstacles for a successful suit. First, because LTD plans deal with post-
employment benefits, most challengers must convince courts that former employees are eligible to 
file suit under Title I of the ADA. This is because Title I of the ADA only prohibits discrimination 
against “qualified individual[s] with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000). The Act defines a 
“qualified individual with a disability” as “an individual with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that 
such individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8). The circuits are split over whether former 
employees fit into this definition of “qualified individuals with a disability.” For arguments in favor 
of the eligibility of former employees to file suit, see Castellano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58 
(2d Cir. 1998); Ford, 145 F.3d at 601. For arguments against, see EEOC v. Group Health Plan, 212 
F. Supp. 2d 1094 (E.D. Mo. 2002); Morgan v. Joint Admin. Bd., 268 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2001); 
Weyer, 198 F.3d 1104; Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 99 F.3d 181 (6th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other 
grounds, 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039 (7th Cir. 
1996); Gonzales, 89 F.3d 1523. If this eligibility requirement is overcome, plaintiffs must show that 
LTD plans that offer different amounts of coverage based on the type of disability (whether mental 
or physical) amount to discrimination under Title I of the ADA. The threshold issue is subordinate to 
whether or not disparity in LTD coverage between mental and physical disabilities is cognizable 
discrimination under the ADA, because the validity of LTD plans does not hinge on a plaintiff’s 
eligibility to sue. Second, and more critical to the validity of the plan, is whether the ADA’s safe 
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disabilities is still at the crux of the legal debate. This Note focuses on 
the physical/mental disparity under Title I, which affects not only the 
future development of LTD plans in response to the increased awareness 
of the need for mental disability coverage, but also affects the more 
important issue of the development of a consistent discrimination 
standard under the ADA. 
This Note contends that Johnson rightly held that the disparity in 
LTD coverage between mental and physical disabilities is discrimination 
under Title I of the ADA, subject to the exception created by the safe 
harbor provision,19 because Johnson correctly applied to Title I the 
broader definition of discrimination from Title II of the ADA as outlined 
by the Supreme Court.20 The Johnson court’s implementation of the 
Supreme Court’s broader Title II definition appropriately accomplishes 
the goals underlying the ADA without discounting the delicate 
compromises that the Act struck in light of the insurance industry’s cost-
containment concerns. Although the safe harbor provision may except 
LTD plans from the general requirements of the Act, which even the 
Johnson court admits,21 this Note contends that such a provision should 
harbor provision excepts LTD plans from the requirements of the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). 
Although never properly addressed, see infra note 21, it is likely that LTD plans do qualify as 
benefit plans under the plain language of the Act. See infra Part II.C. 
 19. See infra note 21. 
 20. Olmstead v. Zimring ex rel. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 21. Even LTD plans that are determined to be discriminatory might be sheltered against the 
ADA within its own safe harbor provision, which allows insurance and “bona fide benefit plan[s]” to 
escape the requirements of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). If LTD plans can be classified as bona 
fide benefit plans, most disparate LTD plans will still be upheld under the ADA. While it is probable 
that LTD plans are bona fide benefit plans, the issue has never been properly addressed by the courts 
(except Johnson) because they have ruled that such plans do not amount to discrimination under the 
ADA without really determining whether they constitute “bona fide benefit plan[s]” under the safe 
harbor provision. Although most courts addressing disparate LTD plans have alluded to the safe 
harbor provision in developing an interpretation of the meaning of discrimination, see Weyer, 198 
F.3d at 1118; Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 435 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The 
ADA’s ‘safe harbor’ provision and the related legislative history suggest that Congress did not 
intend for the ADA to force a change in the way insurers do business.”), and even alluded to the 
classification of LTD plans as benefit plans in dicta, see Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1115–16 (making the 
assertion as an alternative not essential to its holding); Rogers, 174 F.3d at 436 (addressing 
arguments concerning the requirements of § 12201(c) without stating whether or not the section 
applied to LTD plans); Ford, 145 F.3d 601 (same as Rogers), only Johnson has specifically 
examined and declared whether an LTD plan is, in fact, a bona fide benefits plan. Johnson, 273 F.3d 
at 1056–57. In fact, a few courts did not mention the safe harbor at all in examining LTD plans. See 
Kimber, 196 F.3d at 1101; Lewis, 180 F.3d 166. Though the safe harbor provision may be the 
ultimate arbiter in determining whether disparate LTD plans survive the mandates of the ADA, it is 
important that courts create consistent standards for recognizing prohibited discrimination under the 
Act without referring to its exceptions. 
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not shape the general definition of discrimination under the ADA. 
Rather, the safe harbor provision should be construed as a narrow 
exception to the broader interpretation of discrimination established by 
the Eleventh Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit’s construction would provide 
greater protection to the mentally disabled and maintain a more 
consistent criteria and scope for determining cognizable discrimination 
under the Act. 
Part II of this Note outlines Title I of the ADA and how circuit courts 
applied it to LTD plans prior to Johnson.22 To accomplish this, Part II 
begins by describing the interpretation of discrimination under the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the predecessor to the ADA, and then 
compares the Rehabilitation Act’s structure to that found within the 
ADA. Part III outlines Title II of the ADA and the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of discrimination in Olmstead v. Zimring ex rel. L.C.23 Part 
IV outlines the Johnson interpretation of discrimination under Title I and 
addresses critiques of its analysis from prior case law. Part V offers a 
conclusion. 
II. THE ADA AND LTD PLANS 
On July 26, 1990, President George Bush signed the ADA into law, 
describing it as “the world’s first comprehensive declaration of equality 
for people with disabilities.”24 The Act was a “sweeping mandate [to] 
end[] discrimination against persons with disabilities in employment, 
public services and public accommodations provided by private 
entities.”25 The language of the Act mandated “clear, strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities.”26 Thirteen years since its enactment, however, the Act has 
provided courts with very few “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable 
standards” and has instead left courts to puzzle over ambiguities in the 
 22. Part II citations to cases decided after the Johnson opinion serve as additional examples 
of the pre-Johnson analysis. The parts of those opinions that address the analysis of the Johnson 
court will be addressed in Part IV. 
 23. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 24. George Bush, Remarks on Signing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1068 (1990). 
 25. Gold, supra note 12, at 789. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2). 
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language of the Act.27 The central ambiguity of the Act is the meaning of 
“discrimination.” 
Nowhere is the confusion over the meaning of discrimination more 
apparent than in cases in which the Act is applied to disability plans 
offering disparate coverage. Whether such plans are discriminatory has 
been the cause of much litigation and debate. On one level, it is clear that 
such plans make distinctions between different disabilities or conditions 
by the amount of coverage afforded and thus discriminate by type of 
disability.28 On another level, proponents of disparate plans argue the 
distinctions made are not discriminatory because all individuals get the 
same coverage for any particular disability or condition. Although the 
Supreme Court has yet to address this issue directly, the circuit courts 
have generally held that the latter interpretation better suits the purposes 
of the ADA29 by applying the Supreme Court’s discrimination analysis 
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 
A. Discrimination Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
Congress’ first attempt to bring equity and opportunity to disabled 
Americans resulted in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Although the Act 
contains some basic antidiscrimination provisions, Congress focused 
mostly on creating public programs to assist the disabled in leading 
happy, productive lives. The Act contains two basic discrimination 
provisions: one addressing federal government employees and the other 
addressing federally funded programs, contracts, and grants.30 In 
relevant part, the Act provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual 
with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or 
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity . . . conducted by any Executive agency . . . .”31 Two Supreme 
Court cases are central to the interpretation of discrimination under the 
 27. Scholars have argued that these ambiguities are the results of Congress’s allowing 
“idealistic . . . goals [to be] bargained away and dismantled by cost-containment concerns.” Gold, 
supra note 12, at 771 (citing Christopher Aaron Jones, Legislative “Subterfuge”?: Failing to Insure 
Persons with Mental Illness, 50 VAND. L. REV. 753, 757 (1997)). 
 28. See infra text accompanying notes 48–51. 
 29. See infra Part II.D. 
 30. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794 (2000). 
 31. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). 
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ADA, both of which stem from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973: 
Alexander v. Choate32 and Traynor v. Turnage.33
In Alexander, plaintiffs challenged a reduction in the number of 
hospital days covered per year under their state Medicaid program from 
twenty to fourteen days.34 They claimed specifically that the reduction 
violated section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act which, as amended, reads: 
“No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely by 
reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied 
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”35 The plaintiffs 
argued that “given the special needs of the handicapped for medical care, 
any such limitation was likely to disadvantage the handicapped 
disproportionately.”36 The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s 
recognition of cognizable discrimination holding that 
[t]he new limitation does not invoke criteria that have a particular 
exclusionary effect on the handicapped; the reduction, neutral on its 
face, does not distinguish between those whose coverage will be 
reduced and those whose coverage will not on the basis of any test, 
judgment, or trait that the handicapped as a class are less capable of 
meeting or less likely of having.37
This Court’s determination made clear that the Rehabilitation Act 
only requires that a federal program offer the same benefits to all, 
regardless of any one individual’s disability, thus implying that benefits 
for which only disabled individuals have any need, e.g., longer hospital 
visits, would not have to be covered. In making this determination, the 
Court noted the importance of “be[ing] responsive to two powerful but 
 32. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 33. 485 U.S. 535 (1988). 
 34. Alexander, 469 U.S. at 289–90. 
 35. Id. at 290 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 794). 
 36. Id. The undisputed facts of the case indicated that “in the 1979–80 fiscal year, 27.4% of 
all handicapped users of hospital services who received Medicaid required more than 14 days of 
care, while only 7.8% of nonhandicapped users required more than 14 days of inpatient care.” Id. at 
289–90. 
 37. Id. at 302. The only issue before the Supreme Court was whether or not a prima facie 
case for discrimination was present. Id. at 292. Prior to the appeal to the Supreme Court, the Sixth 
Circuit had remanded the case to determine whether there were any “alternative plans that would 
achieve the State’s legitimate cost-saving goals with a less disproportionate impact on the 
handicapped, or [whether] the State could offer a ‘substantial justification for the adoption of the 
plan with the greater discriminatory impact.’” Id. (citing Jennings v. Alexander, 715 F.2d 1036, 1045 
(6th Cir. 1983)). 
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countervailing considerations—the need to give effect to the statutory 
objectives and the desire to keep section 504 within manageable 
bounds.”38
Later, Traynor extended the reasoning of Alexander to distinctions 
made between types of disabilities. In Traynor, the Veterans’ 
Administration refused to extend a ten-year limitation on the educational 
benefits provided by the Veterans’ Readjustment Benefits Act of 1966 to 
veterans who were suffering from alcoholism during the limitation 
period.39 While veterans normally must use the educational benefits 
within ten years of release from service,40 veterans may apply for an 
extension of that ten-year period “if they were prevented from using their 
benefits earlier by ‘a physical or mental disability which was not the 
result of [their] own willful misconduct.’”41 The Veterans’ 
Administration had previously determined that “primary alcoholism,” or 
alcoholism that is not “secondary to and a manifestation of an acquired 
psychiatric disorder,” was a disability resulting from an individual’s 
willful misconduct. Veterans challenged the statute under the 
Rehabilitation Act because it offered benefits to some disabled 
individuals (an opportunity to extend the ten-year limit on educational 
assistance) while denying those same benefits to others.42 From these 
facts, the Court determined, “There is nothing in the Rehabilitation Act 
that requires that any benefit extended to one category of handicapped 
persons also be extended to all other categories of handicapped 
persons,”43 indicating that the Court was unwilling to find discrimination 
where benefit plans preferred one category of disabled individuals over 
another category. 
In summary, Alexander and Traynor created two distinct rules for 
determining discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. First, under 
Alexander, if a policy is neutral in its application and provides the same 
benefits to all regardless of disability, any discriminatory effects of such 
a policy are not actionable discrimination. Second, under Traynor, a 
policy is not discriminatory simply because it provides benefits in 
connection with one class of disability but not with another. Although 
Alexander and Traynor came before the ADA, their interpretations of 
 38. Id. at 299. 
 39. Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 538 (1988). 
 40. See 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1) (2000). 
 41. Traynor, 485 U.S. at 538 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 1662(a)(1)). 
 42. Id. at 548–49. 
 43. Id. at 549. 
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discrimination made a significant impact on judicial analyses of the far-
reaching ADA. Through the ADA, Congress expanded the programs and 
entities that would have to avoid discriminatory behavior and policies. 
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
The ADA contains three central titles that specifically increase the 
number of entities prohibited from engaging in discriminatory behavior. 
Title I expands antidiscrimination requirements to employers, Title II to 
public programs and entities, and Title III to businesses and 
organizations open to the public. The ADA also has a safe harbor 
provision that shelters certain types of insurance and benefit plans from 
the requirements of the ADA. Relative to the Rehabilitation Act, the 
ADA prohibits a greater number of entities from engaging in 
discriminatory behavior. Although the ADA offers many examples of 
discrimination, including types of discrimination that Congress 
specifically recognized in its findings that were not mentioned in the 
Rehabilitation Act, the ADA offers no comprehensive or explicit 
definition of the term. 
Generally, each title of the ADA addresses discrimination. However, 
rather than clearly defining discrimination, Congress outlined ways in 
which individuals with disabilities have been discriminated against 
including “intentional exclusion,” “exclusionary qualification standards,” 
and “segregation”44 within a whole host of different areas.45 Title I is a 
perfect example—it provides specific examples of discrimination 
including “limiting, segregating, or classifying a[n] . . . employee in a 
way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or 
employee because of the disability of such . . . employee” or 
“participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that 
has the effect of subjecting a[n] . . . employee with a disability to . . . 
discrimination . . . [including relationships to] organization[s] providing 
fringe benefits . . . .”46 While Title I offers examples of discrimination, it 
lacks proper criteria for determining discrimination and scope in order to 
limit the types of discrimination prohibited, and therefore does not offer 
an inclusive definition of discrimination. 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2000). 
 45. In whole, § 12101 recognizes that evidence of “discrimination against individuals with 
disabilities persists in such critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, 
education, transportation, communication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, 
and access to public services.” Id. § 12101(a)(3). 
 46. Id. § 12112(b)(1), (2). 
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The Supreme Court has held that absent any “indication to the 
contrary, words in a statute are assumed to bear their ‘ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning.’”47 Discrimination has been defined as 
the act of “mak[ing] a clear distinction.”48 It has often denoted a 
distinction that is “sometimes . . . unjust”49 or made “on the basis of 
prejudice.”50 Black’s Law Dictionary offers two central definitions of 
discrimination that are based loosely on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, discrimination is either “[t]he 
effect of a law or established practice that confers privileges on a certain 
class or that denies privileges to a certain class because of race, age, sex, 
nationality, religion, or handicap” or “[d]ifferential treatment; 
esp[ecially] a failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable 
distinction can be found between those favored and those not favored.”51 
Despite these broad definitions, circuit courts have tended to narrow the 
meaning of discrimination for purposes of the ADA. The various circuit 
court interpretations of discrimination concerning disparate treatment 
cannot be understood without first understanding the nature of the 
challenge against specific LTD plans and the applicable provisions of the 
ADA. 
C. The General Challenge Against LTD Plans and the Applicable 
Provisions of the ADA 
The most commonly challenged LTD plans, as described in the 
introduction, have distinguished between coverage of mental disabilities 
and physical disabilities by placing a time cap on mental disability 
benefits. Challenges against these types of plans have claimed that they 
are discriminatory because individuals with mental disabilities do not 
enjoy the same amount of coverage as those with physical disabilities. 
Each case involved an employee who had (1) enrolled in a disability plan 
that limited the coverage for mental disabilities to a period of years or 
months (while offering coverage for physical disabilities until the 
 47. Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 207 (1997) (quoting Pioneer Inv. 
Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993)). 
 48. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 517 
(Houghton Mifflin 4th ed. 2000) (defining “discriminate” as “to make a clear distinction,” “to 
distinguish,” or “to differentiate”). 
 49. FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 724 
(Isaac K. Fund et al. eds., 1963). 
 50. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, supra note 48, at 517. 
 51. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 479 (emphasis added). 
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disabled employee reached sixty or sixty-five years of age); (2) stopped 
working due to a mental disability; and (3) had his or her insurance 
benefits cancelled at the end of the limited-coverage period.52 The facts 
of Johnson are typical. 
In 1996, James Johnson, a Kmart Corporation (“Kmart”) store 
manager, “sought medical treatment for severe depression and emotional 
illness.”53 Johnson continued working for Kmart until October of 1997, 
when, following the advice of his physician, he “stop[ped] working due 
to his mental illness.”54 At that point, Johnson applied for and began to 
receive long-term disability benefits. Under the Kmart LTD plan, 
“employees who [were] disabled due to a mental illness [received] 
salary-replacement benefits for two years,” while “employees disabled 
due to a physical illness [received] such benefits until age 65.”55 Johnson 
filed a charge of discrimination in July of 1998 with the EEOC claiming 
that the mental-health-related disability cap on benefits violated the 
ADA.56 After receiving a Right to Sue letter from the EEOC, Johnson 
brought the action in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida in November of 1998.57
Two general provisions of the ADA are relevant to disparate LTD 
plans like the one in Johnson: Title I generally prohibits discrimination 
in employment practices, and the safe harbor provision generally 
excludes bona fide benefit plans from the requirements of the Act. 
Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against disabled 
individuals by employers and related entities including “employment 
agenc[ies], labor organization[s], or joint labor-management 
committee[s].”58 The Act declares that these entities shall not 
“discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of 
the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, 
 52. See EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2000); Weyer v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000); Kimber v. Thiokol Corp., 
196 F.3d 1092, 1097 (10th Cir. 1999); Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 168 (4th Cir. 1999); 
Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 1998); Parker v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 121 
F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc); EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 
1996). 
 53. Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir.) (panel), reh’g en banc granted, 
panel opinion vacated 273 F.3d at 1070 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(2) (2000). 
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the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.”59 The bulk of this Note is devoted to determining the 
meaning of this provision as applied to disparate LTD plans.60
Congress designed the safe harbor provision of the ADA to allow 
insurance companies and others to deal properly with risk factors in 
insurance plans.61 In relevant part, the safe harbor provision explains that 
the Act “shall not be construed to prohibit or restrict . . . any agent, or 
entity that administers benefit plans, or similar organizations from 
underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks that are 
based on or not inconsistent with State law”; nor shall the Act be 
construed to prohibit or restrict those who “establish[], sponsor[], 
observe[] or administer[] the terms of a bona fide benefit plan that are 
based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks 
that are based on or not inconsistent with State law.”62 Along with 
requiring that the safe harbor protection only be available to health 
insurance or bona fide benefit plans that follow proper procedures of 
underwriting, classifying, or administering risks, the Act explains that the 
safe harbor provisions “shall not be used as a subterfuge to evade the 
purposes of subchapter [sic] I and III of this chapter.”63
At first glance, LTD plans appear to be bona fide benefit plans under 
§ 12201(c)(2). However, courts addressing disparate LTD plans 
generally, with the exception of Johnson, never reach the safe harbor 
analysis and focus instead on the complicated question of discrimination 
under the Act.64 The Johnson court aside, only a single circuit judge, in a 
 59. Id. § 12112(a). 
 60. As noted above, the ADA defines a “qualified individual with a disability” as a person 
who “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the 
employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Id. § 12111(8). Though the definition is 
applicable to LTD challenges, that issue is not addressed in this Note. See supra note 18. 
 61. The business of insurance includes carefully assessing the probabilities of members of the 
plan having need of any particular treatments. Those probabilities are then used to determine the 
amount of coverage the insurance can offer for different treatments, diseases, or disabilities and still 
maintain financial viability. This process is usually called underwriting, classifying, or administering 
risks and is referred to as such in the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c). 
 62. Id. § 12201(c)(1)–(2). 
 63. Id. § 12201(c). 
 64. EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2000); Weyer v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 2000); Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 
168–69 (4th Cir. 1999); Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 604 (3d Cir. 1998); EEOC v. 
Group Health Plan, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (E.D. Mo. 2002); Wilson v. Globe Specialty Prods., Inc., 
117 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D. Mass. 2000). 
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legally insignificant concurrence in a Third Circuit case, has pointed out 
that § 12201(c)(2) applies to LTD plans as bona fide benefit plans, and 
that meandering through case law and congressional intent to understand 
the meaning of discrimination is therefore unnecessary.65 The Johnson 
court, however, determined that LTD plans generally were bona fide 
benefit plans66 and remanded the case for a determination of whether 
Kmart’s disparate LTD plan was a “subterfuge to evade the purposes” of 
the ADA which would disqualify the plan from fitting within the safe 
harbor exemption.67
Prior to Johnson, circuit courts generally applied the discrimination 
standard of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as promulgated in Alexander 
and Traynor68 to disparate LTD plans. In doing so, the circuit courts 
have construed the safe harbor as narrowing the interpretation of 
discrimination in order to find that disparate LTD plans do not 
discriminate under the general provisions of the ADA. This renders any 
inquiry into whether such plans qualify for the safe harbor exception 
irrelevant. 
D. Circuit Court Analysis of Disparate LTD Plans Under the ADA Prior 
to Johnson 
Federal circuit courts have generally determined that disparate LTD 
plans lend themselves to a Title I analysis because they affect “terms, 
conditions, and privileges of employment” and often deal with a 
“contractual or other . . . relationship,” such as “an organization 
providing fringe benefits.”69 When analyzing LTD plan challenges under 
the ADA, circuit courts have applied the definition of discrimination the 
 65. Ford, 145 F.3d at 614 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). 
 66. Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1056 (11th Cir.) (panel) (holding that the 
question was undisputed by the parties), reh’g en banc granted, panel opinion vacated 273 F.3d at 
1070 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 67. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)). The Johnson court followed the analysis of the 
Supreme Court concerning the meaning of subterfuge under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (ADEA), see Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989), and remanded the case to 
determine whether Kmart had “specifically intended to use § 12201(c) as a subterfuge to evade the 
purposes of Title I.” Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1059. For more analysis on the meaning of subterfuge, see 
H. Miriam Farber, Subterfuge: Do Coverage Limitations and Exclusions in Employer-Provided 
Health Care Plans Violate the Americans with Disabilities Act? 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 850 (1994). 
Johnson remanded the case to determine whether Kmart had the intent to evade the Act. 
 68. See supra Part II.A. 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (b)(2); see, e.g., Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1050–51; Staten Island Sav. 
Bank, 207 F.3d at 148–49. 
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Supreme Court used in interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. As 
applied to cases brought under the ADA, this definition requires that 
plaintiffs show differential treatment when comparing their position as a 
disabled individual with nondisabled individuals. In applying this 
definition to LTD plans, circuit courts have held that LTD plans are not 
discriminatory because they give the same benefits to all who enroll, 
despite the fact that the plans cover less for mental disabilities. Circuit 
courts have also added arguments to the Supreme Court’s Rehabilitation 
Act analysis, relying heavily on government agency interpretation, 
congressional action since the passage of the ADA, and other provisions 
in the ADA. To pre-Johnson circuit courts, the cost-containment 
concerns of any type of insurance coverage like those offered in LTD 
plans justified a definition of discrimination that did not include 
differences in treatment or coverage allowances provided between 
mental and physical disabilities. 
1. The circuit courts’ general reliance on the interpretations of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
Circuit courts have relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act when interpreting the ADA. For 
example, in Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., the Third Circuit addressed 
an issue identical to that in Johnson.70 The court explained that the 
Supreme Court’s analysis of the Rehabilitation Act in Alexander v. 
Choate71 and Traynor v. Turnage72 developed the basic meaning for 
discrimination under the ADA.  
The Ford court adopted both the neutrality rule from Alexander and 
the general rule about distinctions between different disabilities from 
Traynor in holding that disparate LTD plans were not discrimination 
under the ADA. First, the Ford court referred to Alexander: 
[T]he Supreme Court held that the limit on inpatient hospital care was 
“neutral on its face[]” and did not “distinguish between those whose 
coverage will be reduced and those whose coverage will not on the 
basis of any test, judgment, or trait that the handicapped as a class are 
less capable of meeting or less likely of having.”73
 70. Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 603–04 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 71. 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 72. 485 U.S. 535 (1988). 
 73. Ford, 145 F.3d at 608 (summarizing and quoting Alexander, 469 U.S. at 302). 
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The Ford court was able to apply the Alexander Court’s reasoning to 
comfortably claim that “[s]o long as every employee is offered the same 
plan regardless of that employee’s contemporary or future disability 
status, then no discrimination has occurred even if the plan offers 
different coverage for various disabilities.”74 The Ford court then cited 
Traynor75 and held that “[w]hile the [employer’s] insurance plan 
differentiated between types of disabilities, this is a far cry from a 
specific disabled employee facing differential treatment due to her 
disability.”76
The holdings in Ford and other similar cases represent a typical 
understanding of the meaning of discrimination. This meaning involves a 
necessary comparison between the protected class (individuals with 
disabilities) and the general public (nondisabled persons). If both classes 
are given the same privileges or benefits at the same cost, then no 
discrimination has occurred.77 Consequently, these cases conclude that 
distinctions between different types of disabilities cannot be 
discrimination because such a distinction does not involve a comparison 
between the protected class and the general public, but between two 
segments of the protected class.78
2. Additional support for applying the Rehabilitation Act standard 
Along with this basic interpretation of discrimination, circuit courts 
have identified additional support for the application of the 
Rehabilitation Act standard. Specifically, these courts point to the 
ADA’s safe harbor provision that protects insurance companies, 
legislative history, past statements of the EEOC, congressional activity 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 608–09 (“There is nothing in the Rehabilitation Act that requires that any benefit 
extended to one category of handicapped persons also be extended to all other categories of 
handicapped persons.” (quoting Traynor, 485 U.S. at 549)). 
 76. Id. at 608. The Third Circuit also noted a similar interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act 
within one of its own opinions. Id. at 609 (citing Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1979)). 
 77. See Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“[I]nsurance distinctions that apply equally to all employees cannot be discriminatory.”); EEOC v. 
CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996) (“All employees—the perfectly healthy, the 
physically disabled, and the mentally disabled—had a plan that promised them [the same] long-term 
benefits . . . . This may or may not be an enlightened way to do things, but it was not discriminatory 
in the usual sense . . . .”). 
 78. See Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 180 F.3d 166, 171 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[O]ur federal disability 
statutes ensure that disabled persons are treated evenly in relation to nondisabled persons.”). 
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since the passage of the ADA and the continued debate over parity, and 
the destabilization of the insurance industry. 
A couple of circuits have cited the safe harbor provision of the 
ADA79 for support of the Alexander and Traynor definitions of 
discrimination, claiming that the safe harbor narrows the definition of 
discrimination used within the ADA. The Fourth Circuit’s Rogers 
decision, for example, cited this provision as proof that Congress did not 
intend the definition of discrimination to affect benefit plans like LTD 
plans and thus narrowed the scope of cognizable discrimination under the 
Act in order to allow insurance companies to function.80 Rogers thus 
reflects an interpretation of discrimination that utilizes the safe harbor 
provision to narrow the scope of cognizable discrimination rather than 
carve out a narrow exception to a broader interpretation of 
discrimination. 
Several courts have relied on the committee statements made during 
the drafting of the ADA, which garner support for following the 
Alexander and Traynor interpretations of the Rehabilitation Act. For 
instance, the House and Senate committees working on the ADA 
explained: 
[T]he Committee also wishes to clarify that in its view, as is stated by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Alexander v. Choate, . . . employee benefits 
plans should not be found to be in violation of this legislation under 
impact analysis simply because they do not address the special needs of 
every person with a disability, e.g., additional sick leave or medical 
coverage.81
In addition, the Senate committee explained that it is “permissible for 
an employer to offer insurance policies that limit coverage for certain 
procedures or treatments, e.g., only a specified amount per year for 
 79. The safe harbor provision of the ADA is designed to allow insurance companies and 
others to deal properly with risk factors. For the basic text of the ADA safe harbor, see supra text 
accompanying notes 61–63. 
 80. See Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 435 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The 
ADA’s ‘safe harbor’ provision and the related legislative history suggest that Congress did not 
intend for the ADA to force a change in the way insurers do business.” (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, 
at 84–85 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 136 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 419)); 
see also Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1116. 
 81. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 85; H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 137, reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 420. 
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mental health coverage . . . .”82 Almost every circuit addressing this issue 
cites or quotes such statements.83
Some courts found further support for the prevailing understanding 
of “discrimination” in statements by the EEOC indicating that plans 
similar to those at issue in Johnson complied with the ADA. The EEOC 
had previously indicated that disparate LTD plans were essentially legal 
under the ADA which, according to some courts, indicated compliance 
with the ADA. The Fourth Circuit pointed out that the EEOC had 
described typical health insurance plans as making 
a distinction between the benefits provided for the treatment of physical 
conditions . . . and the benefits provided for the treatment of 
“mental/nervous” conditions . . . . Typically, a lower level of benefits is 
provided for the treatment of mental/nervous conditions than is 
provided for the treatment of physical conditions . . . . Such broad 
distinctions, which apply to the treatment of a multitude of dissimilar 
conditions and which constrain individuals both with and without 
disabilities, are not distinctions based on disability.84
Other courts upholding disparate LTD plans have since cited to the 
Fourth Circuit’s findings.85
Subsequent congressional activity may also support this 
interpretation of discrimination within the ADA. Many circuit courts 
have cited a passage of the MHPA as proof that Congress did not intend 
discrimination under the original ADA to include disparate treatment of 
physical and mental disabilities. The MHPA requires that health 
insurance plans offer substantially the same lifetime and annual limits in 
coverage for mental health benefits as those offered for both medical and 
surgical benefits, with a few limited exceptions.86 In passing the MHPA, 
 82. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 29. 
 83. See, e.g., EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2000); Rogers, 
174 F.3d at 434–35; Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 610 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 84. Rogers, 174 F.3d at 435 (citing EEOC: Interim Guidance on Application of ADA to 
Health Insurance (June 8, 1993), reprinted in Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 405:7115, at 7118). The 
issue in Rogers was addressed under Title II of the ADA because the employer in that case was a 
public entity. However, because the issue in that case involved a public entity as an employer rather 
than as a public program provider, it is arguable that the suit should have been brought under Title I. 
 85. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (“Even 
the EEOC concluded in their guidance on health insurance, contrary to their litigation position in this 
case, that distinctions between types of disability do not violate the [ADA].”); Lewis v. Kmart Corp., 
180 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Rogers’ use of a “public policy statement of the EEOC”). 
 86. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-5(a) (2000); see supra text accompanying note 13; Weirich & Sharma, 
supra note 9, at 470–74. 
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Congress specifically rejected an amendment to the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)87 “which would 
have mandated parity in insurance coverage for mental and physical 
illnesses.”88 Courts have determined that the passage of the MHPA 
necessarily means that the ADA did not account for such 
discrimination.89 Other courts have simply used this piece of legislation 
and the rejection of the amendment as an example of the contested nature 
of the issue of parity for mental health coverage and have been “loath to 
read into [the Act] a rule that has been the subject of vigorous, 
sometimes contentious, national debate for the last several years.”90
Finally, courts have almost universally feared that if the ADA 
“require[ed] equal coverage for every type of disability[,] such a 
requirement . . . would destabilize the insurance industry in a manner 
definitely not intended by Congress when passing the ADA.”91 Although 
there is no direct statutory language identifying this concern, it is 
evidenced not only in the safe harbor provisions,92 but also in the 
congressional statements concerning health insurance coverage of 
treatments for mental illness.93
Most of the circuit decisions analyzing this issue, however, were 
handed down before the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of 
discrimination under the ADA and were based upon the Court’s 
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act, a similar though not identical act. 
The Supreme Court finally analyzed the meaning of discrimination under 
the ADA in Olmstead v. Zimring ex rel. L.C.94
 87. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified primarily in Titles 18, 26, and 42 of 
the U.S.C.). 
 88. Ford, 145 F.3d at 610. 
 89. Rogers, 174 F.3d at 436 (“All of this [passage of the MHPA and other legislation] 
suggests that Congress does not believe that the ADA already mandates equal treatment in benefits 
coverage for mental and physical disabilities.”); Ford, 145 F.3d at 610 (“Such congressional action 
reveals both that the ADA does not contain parity requirements and that no parity requirements for 
mental and physical disability benefits have been enacted subsequent to the ADA.”). 
 90. EEOC v. CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1044 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 91. Ford, 145 F.3d at 608; see supra note 12. 
 92. See supra Part II.C. 
 93. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text. 
 94. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). The cases decided after Olmstead, cited in Part II.C, are used to 
reference arguments that were also made in essentially the same context prior to the Olmstead 
decision. 
PRA-FIN.DOC 2/18/2004  12:24:12 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
1438 
 
III. OLMSTEAD AND THE MEANING OF “DISCRIMINATION” 
UNDER TITLE II 
The plaintiffs in Johnson requested an expansion of the definition of 
discrimination under Title I of the ADA so that discrimination could be 
found when comparing two individuals within the protected class 
(mentally disabled individuals versus physically disabled individuals), 
rather than being limited to comparisons between individuals within the 
protected class and the general public. This request relied heavily on the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of discrimination under Title II of the 
ADA in Olmstead v. Zimring ex rel. L.C.,95 which found discrimination 
by comparing individuals within the protected class. 
A. Title II of the ADA 
The discrimination provision of Title II in the ADA is 
distinguishable from Title I in several ways,96 but the only relevant 
difference for the purpose of interpreting the meaning of discrimination 
is an additional example of discrimination. Specifically, Title II not only 
prohibits any “discrimination by . . . [a public] entity,” but also 
specifically prohibits a “qualified individual with a disability” from 
“be[ing] excluded from participation in or be[ing] denied the benefits of 
the services, programs, or activities of a public entity.”97 Thus, for the 
purpose of determining the meaning of discrimination, Title II’s statutory 
language only differs from the definition in Title I by adding an 
additional provision that specifically prohibits exclusion from the 
programs or services of public entities. Olmstead, however, expanded the 
meaning of discrimination under Title II beyond the definitions provided 
in Alexander and Traynor to recognize discrimination between 
individuals within the protected class. 
 95. Id. 
 96. As mentioned above, Title II applies to government entities rather than private employers 
and sets forth the prohibitions “against discrimination in . . . public services furnished by 
governmental entities.” Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 589. While Title II still requires that a person be a 
“qualified individual with a disability,” Title II defines this term as “an[y] individual with a 
disability who, with or without reasonable modifications . . . meets the essential eligibility 
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a 
public entity,” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000), rather than “an individual who, with or without 
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that 
such individual holds or desires,” id. § 12111(8). 
 97. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
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B. Cognizable Discrimination Under Olmstead 
In Olmstead, two institutionalized, developmentally disabled women 
alleged that the State’s procedures concerning their institutionalization 
were discriminatory under the ADA. Specifically, the women claimed 
that the “State’s failure to place [them] in a community-based program, 
once [their] treating professionals determined that such placement was 
appropriate, violated, inter alia, Title II of the ADA.”98 The Court held 
that the women’s institutionalization was discrimination prohibited by 
the ADA because their psychiatrists and other specialists had determined 
that the two women could live in a less-restrictive environment and the 
State maintained a less-restrictive community-based program.99
While the Court seemed driven by several statements made within 
the ADA that condemned isolation and segregation of disabled 
individuals as a particularly heinous type of discrimination,100 and gave 
deference to the Attorney General’s regulations regarding 
institutionalization,101 the Court based its central legal analysis on a 
broader issue, namely, whether “[u]ndue institutionalization qualifie[d] 
as discrimination ‘by reason of . . . disability.’”102 The State argued that 
“‘discrimination’ necessarily requires uneven treatment of similarly 
situated individuals” and attempted to shift the burden to the plaintiffs to 
identify a “comparison class, i.e., . . . similarly situated individuals given 
preferential treatment.”103 To this argument the Court responded, “We 
 98. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 594. 
 99. Id. at 600–03. The facts of Olmstead do not specifically indicate what other types of 
mentally disabled individuals utilized the community-based program, but it is clear that there were 
several types of community-based programs, id. at 593 (noting that “L. C.’s treatment team . . . [had] 
agreed that her needs could be met appropriately in one of the community-based programs” provided 
by the State) (emphasis added), and individuals utilizing these programs may have had many types 
of disabilities. Though the disabilities were probably mostly mental ones, the programs likely 
involved many types of mental disabilities all in a similar situation to the plaintiffs in Olmstead. At 
the very least, the Court had to compare different individuals from the same protected class whether 
they had similar disabilities or not. 
 100. Id. at 588–89 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3), (5)). 
 101. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1998). The “integration regulation” reads, “A public entity 
shall administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the 
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.” Id. “[T]he most integrated setting appropriate to the 
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities” has been defined as “a setting that enables 
individuals with disabilities to interact with non-disabled persons to the fullest extent possible.” 28 
C.F.R. pt. 35, app. A, at 469 (1998) (discussing 28 C.F.R. 35.130(d)–(e)). 
 102. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597. 
 103. Id. at 598 (citing petitioners’ brief at 21). The dissent agreed with the State, arguing that 
“this Court has never endorsed an interpretation of the term ‘discrimination’ that encompassed 
disparate treatment among members of the same protected class.” Id. at 616 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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are satisfied that Congress had a more comprehensive view of the 
concept of discrimination advanced in the ADA.”104 In countering the 
State’s argument, the Court cited O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin 
Caterers Corp.,105 where the Court, in interpreting the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), noted: “The fact 
that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the 
protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his 
age.”106 The Court’s use of the O’Connor discrimination standard 
marked the first time discrimination under the ADA was expanded to 
include disparate treatment of individuals within a protected class. 
Though the Court refrained from directly recognizing the broader 
implications of its decision, the holding will force future courts to 
consider discrimination between individuals within a protected class, i.e., 
between two disabled individuals. This is because the only way to 
determine that the women in Olmstead were discriminated against 
because of institutionalization rather than community-based care 
program placement is to compare them with others who are already in 
community-based care programs, i.e., other disabled individuals. 
Therefore, the Court, in order to maintain its holding, had to compare 
how these women were treated in their situation with the way other 
disabled individuals, who possibly had different disabilities, were treated 
in theirs. 
Within the opinion, the above analysis is overshadowed by the 
Court’s concern with the unnecessary institutionalization and segregation 
of disabled individuals gleaned from the ADA’s congressional 
findings.107 The Court’s emphasis on the congressional purposes of the 
ADA made the Court appear unconscious of the expanded definition it 
was forming. The dissent seemed to be more aware than the majority of 
the change being made to the traditional understanding of discrimination 
under the ADA. Justice Thomas explained that “[t]emporary exclusion 
from community placement does not amount to ‘discrimination’ in the 
traditional sense of the word.”108 Thomas noted this change from “the 
traditional sense of the word” by citing the differences between the rule 
 104. Id. at 598. 
 105. Id. at 598 n.10 (citing O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 
(1996)). 
 106. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312. 
 107. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 588–89 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3), (5) (2000)). 
 108. Id. at 616 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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derived from Olmstead and the rules in Alexander and Traynor.109 The 
dissent also noted that the majority “chiefly relies on certain 
congressional findings contained within the ADA” to reach its more 
comprehensive definition of discrimination, and then claimed that such 
congressional findings “provide little guidance to the interpretation of the 
specific language of § 12132 [of the ADA].”110 While the dissent did not 
value congressional findings in interpreting the ADA, it acknowledged 
that Congress may have intended Title I of the ADA to have a broader 
application because of its peculiar definition of discrimination.111
The dissent’s argument, however, is not entirely persuasive because 
circuit courts do not rely solely upon the Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Rehabilitation Act in defining discrimination under the ADA. The 
majority noted several cases that had already expanded the meaning of 
discrimination in other legislation,112 and there was no reason to believe 
that discrimination under the ADA was limited to the Court’s 
interpretation of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. The 
majority felt that the congressional findings relied on in enacting the 
ADA were a more appropriate source for a definition of discrimination 
than the Rehabilitation Act or statements made by the congressional 
committees during the passage of the ADA.113
With the understanding that Olmstead stands for the proposition that 
discrimination under the ADA can exist within the protected class, the 
next section focuses on disparate LTD plans under Title I in Johnson. 
 109. Id. at 619–20 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining that Alexander v. Choate upheld a 
statute that appeared to put the disabled at a disadvantage because it was “neutral on its face,” 469 
U.S. 287, 302 (1985), and that in Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1988), the Court 
“reiterated that the purpose of [the Rehabilitation Act] is to guarantee that individuals with 
disabilities receive ‘evenhanded treatment’ relative to those persons without disabilities”—both of 
which differ from the “comprehensive” definition of discrimination upheld by the court here). 
 110. Id. at 620–21 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 
510 U.S. 249, 260 (1994) (“We also think that the quoted statement of congressional findings is a 
rather thin reed upon which to base a requirement.”). 
 111. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 622–23 (“The majority’s definition of discrimination . . . 
substantially imports the definition of Title I into Title II by necessarily assuming that it is sufficient 
to focus exclusively on members of one particular group.”). 
 112. See id. at 598 n.10 (citing several cases, the most relevant being O’Connor v. 
Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996)). 
 113. The Supreme Court does not mention the statements made by several congressional 
committees that were relied on so heavily in the circuit court definitions of discrimination 
previously. See supra text accompanying notes 80–82. This is most likely because those statements 
were directed mostly at the problem of insurance and benefits plans and had no real place in the 
scope or definition of discrimination. See supra Part III.A. 
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IV. THE JOHNSON ANALYSIS AND APPLYING OLMSTEAD TO TITLE I 
In November 2001, more than a year after the Olmstead decision, the 
Eleventh Circuit used the Supreme Court’s analysis to expand the 
definition of discrimination under Title I of the ADA and upend the 
traditional discrimination analysis,114 including two decisions that had 
briefly addressed Olmstead.115 In Johnson, the Eleventh Circuit relied on 
the implications of the Olmstead ruling and recognized that the expanded 
definition would not have any of the detrimental effects that troubled the 
other circuits.116 Johnson not only created a more reasonable definition 
of discrimination—one that takes into account all forms of 
discrimination117—but also properly used the safe harbor provision 
within its analysis to alleviate insurance concerns. Unlike many of its 
sister circuits, the Eleventh Circuit completely separated its application 
of the ADA’s discrimination standard from its application of the safe 
harbor exception.118 This enabled the Eleventh Circuit to come to a 
clearer definition of discrimination, based on the findings of Congress 
and the language of the Act, without muddling the definition with the 
exception created by the safe harbor provision. Thus, though most 
disparate LTD plans will still be able to comply with the ADA by 
utilizing the safe harbor provisions, the Eleventh Circuit analysis should 
outlast its sister circuits’ analyses because it creates a surer standard for 
determining cognizable discrimination under the ADA and will place 
LTD and other similar plans under the sharper scrutiny of the safe harbor 
provision. 
A. The Meaning of Discrimination Under Title I 
After describing the plain language of the ADA, the Eleventh Circuit 
determined the scope of “legally cognizable” discrimination under the 
ADA. In doing so, it recognized that the Olmstead definition of 
discrimination replaced the traditional meaning of discrimination in Title 
 114. See supra Part II.D. 
 115. See EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 151 (2d Cir. 2000); Weyer v. 
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 116. See supra note 12 and Part II.D.2. 
 117. See supra notes 48–51. 
 118. See Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1050 (11th Cir.) (emphasizing that “the 
concept of discrimination in Title I as a threshold matter” allowing the court “to proceed to a more 
specific consideration of disparate treatment in the insurance context, and, then, to an application of 
the insurance safe harbor provision . . . .”), reh’g en banc granted, panel opinion vacated 273 F.3d at 
1070 (11th Cir. 2001). 
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I cases, which was based on Alexander and Traynor, with O’Conner’s 
interpretation of the term within the ADEA. The Eleventh Circuit 
reached this result through careful application of the Supreme Court’s 
language in Olmstead. In addition, Johnson alleviates many of the policy 
concerns posed by other circuits. 
First, the Johnson court noted the application of Title I specifically to 
LTD plans through the language of § 12112, which specifically prohibits 
employers from discriminating against “qualified individual[s] with a 
disability” in “terms, conditions, and privileges of employment”119 and 
from “participating in a contractual . . . relationship that has the effect of 
subjecting a covered entity’s qualified . . . employee with a disability to 
the discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship 
includes a relationship with an employment or referral agency, labor 
union, an organization providing fringe benefits to an employee . . .).”120 
LTD plans are clearly either a “privilege of employment” or a “fringe 
benefit.” 
Next, the court cited the Olmstead decision explaining that 
“[Olmstead] controls [the circuit’s] understanding of the concept of 
discrimination embodied in Title I of the ADA” and that “[t]he gravamen 
of a disability-based discrimination claim is that an individual has been 
treated less favorably because of her disability.”121 The court also noted 
the Olmstead dissent’s acknowledgement that Title I might include this 
type of discrimination while Title II does not.122 Olmstead had 
announced a standard for discrimination specifically for the ADA while 
previous Supreme Court cases, Alexander and Traynor, had only 
developed a standard for the Rehabilitation Act. This fact is even more 
significant considering the amendments Congress made to the 
Rehabilitation Act after the enactment of the ADA in 1992, because 
those amendments specifically adopted the discrimination standards of 
the ADA for the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act.123
The Eleventh Circuit also dealt with the legislative history that other 
circuits claimed meant disparate LTD plans could not be discrimination 
under the ADA.124 The court countered the committee statements by 
distinguishing the situations to which they applied from the facts of a 
 119. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000)). 
 120. Id. at 1051 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2)). 
 121. Id. at 1052–53. 
 122. See supra note 111. 
 123. See infra note 127. 
 124. See supra text accompanying notes 80–85. 
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disparate LTD plan. Specifically, the court noted that while “[t]he 
Committee Reports suggest no intention to interfere with insurance 
arrangements which set caps on ‘procedures or treatments’ that apply to 
persons with or without disabilities,” disparate LTD plans 
deal[] not with a limitation on procedures and treatments equally 
available to all but a limitation on compensation in lieu of salary which 
is expressly contingent on what kind of disability has caused a former 
employee to lose his job. Giving the legislative reports their full weight, 
the type of differentiation that they [the committee statements] protect 
is not the type of differentiation at issue in this case.125
The court declared that all of the Committee Report statements are 
completely “disability neutral” and simply refer to the ability of 
insurance companies to evaluate the coverage of “myriad potential 
medical procedures or treatments,” while disparate LTD plans contain a 
single payment “intended to partially replace . . . salary,” and “[d]enial of 
that benefit on the express ground that the claimant is mentally disabled 
is discrimination . . . prohibited by § 12112(a)—unless the ADA’s safe 
harbor provision exempts such discrimination from liability.”126 In 
addition to the legislative history of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act’s 
amendments support a change to the meaning of discrimination at the 
time the ADA was enacted. 127
Johnson’s rebuttal to the congressional committee statements can 
also be used to refute the other circuits’ reliance on a 1993 statement by 
the EEOC regarding application of the ADA to health insurance.128 Like 
the congressional committee statements, the EEOC statement does not 
directly apply to LTD plans, but rather to health insurance plans. LTD 
plans can be distinguished from health insurance because they offer 
different benefits (payments in lieu of salary when disability makes it 
impossible for the recipient to work) and are not tied to treatments or 
procedures. Because the previous EEOC statement applies directly to 
insurance plans, the 1993 statement likely takes into account the safe 
harbor provision of the ADA, which protects insurance companies and 
may not apply to all employment benefits. Since the EEOC position in 
 125. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1055–56. 
 126. Id. at 1056. For more on the safe harbor provision, see supra text accompanying notes 
61–63. 
 127. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 791(g), 794(d) (“The standards used to determine whether this section 
has been violated in complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the 
standards applied under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act . . . .”). 
 128. See supra text accompanying note 84. 
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recent litigation is clearly contrary to the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation 
of the 1993 EEOC statement, it is fitting that courts interpret the EEOC’s 
original statement so as to coincide with its current position. Thus, courts 
should interpret the EEOC’s statement narrowly. 
While identifying a new standard for discrimination under the ADA, 
the Johnson court also fully addressed the safe harbor provision of the 
ADA and determined that the Kmart LTD plan was a “bona fide benefit 
plan” that qualified for the protection of the safe harbor provision and 
remanded for further proceedings to give the plaintiff the opportunity to 
show that the Kmart LTD plan “constitutes a use of the safe harbor 
provision as a ‘subterfuge to evade the purposes’ of Title I.”129
Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s Rogers decision, Johnson properly used 
the ADA’s safe harbor provision as an exception to the scope of 
discrimination in the Act rather than a provision that defines its scope.130 
An exception to the ADA ought not to dictate the scope of it. In fact, the 
existence of this exception contradicts the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion,131 
because an exception to the rule indicates that without the exception, the 
general prohibition of discrimination would include disparate insurance 
plans like many LTDs.132 Thus, the Fourth Circuit’s concern that a more 
expansive definition of discrimination would interfere with insurance 
companies is unfounded because the concern is alleviated by the safe 
harbor provision rather than supported by it. In other words, because of 
the safe harbor provision, discrimination can be defined as expansively 
as necessary to address the purposes of the Act without affecting 
insurance risk classifying procedures. 
 129. Johnson, 273 F.3d at 1056 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (2000)). The determination that 
the LTD plan was a bona fide benefits plan must have been stipulated to by the parties because the 
court noted that the only disputed issue regarding the safe harbor was concerning the subterfuge 
provision. 
 130. See Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Control, 174 F.3d 431, 435 (4th Cir. 1999) (“The 
ADA’s ‘safe harbor’ provision and the related legislative history suggest that Congress did not 
intend for the ADA to force a change in the way insurers do business.” (citing S. REP. NO. 101-116, 
at 84–85 (1989); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 136 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 419). 
 131. See id.; Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 132. But see EEOC v. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 150 (2d Cir. 2000) (arguing that 
the safe harbor provision “does not shed light on the scope of the anti-discrimination provision[] . . . 
[and] . . . is as consistent with the position of the defendants . . . as it is with the position of the 
[plaintiffs]”). This, however, only neutralizes the interpretative value of the provision. 
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B. Policy Considerations 
The Johnson treatment of the safe harbor provision also answers the 
other circuits’ policy concerns. These concerns include a fear of 
interfering with the current congressional debate and destabilizing the 
insurance industry. 
Several circuit courts were concerned with marring the current 
debate in Congress. For instance, previous circuit decisions cited the 
MHPA and a refusal to amend HIPAA as an example of the continued 
debate.133 The MHPA, however, applies directly to “group health 
plan[s],”134 which were purposefully placed outside the scope of the 
ADA under the safe harbor provision. Thus, the MHPA is just as likely 
to be a congressional attempt to apply ADA principles to insurance 
companies where the ADA excluded them. Although there is still heavy 
debate regarding how to treat insurance companies and bona fide benefit 
plans with respect to parity for mental health coverage, courts may still 
interpret the ADA as classifying disparity in coverage between mental 
and physical disabilities as discrimination without marring the current 
debate because the safe harbor provision leaves insurance companies 
unaffected. 
The fear among the circuits that the Johnson interpretation of 
discrimination under the ADA will disrupt the insurance industry is 
unfounded—not because the full enforcement of the ADA would not 
upset the insurance industry,135 but because the ADA specifically 
exempts insurance and bona fide benefit plans from compliance with 
ADA standards when they are engaged in the usual insurance practices 
of underwriting, classifying, or administering risks136 and are not using 
the safe harbor as a “subterfuge.” Congress was aware of the insurance 
problem and specifically created the safe harbor to alleviate this concern. 
One might argue that the Eleventh Circuit analysis does not affect 
the end result because disparate LTD plans will still withstand scrutiny 
within the safe harbor provision. While the end result will not always 
change, the rule derived from Johnson does tip the scales toward 
plaintiffs. This is because by completely separating the discrimination 
analysis from the safe harbor analysis, the Johnson court allows plaintiffs 
two additional avenues of attack. First, plaintiffs can attack the 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 86–90. 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-5(a)(1). 
 135. See supra note 12. 
 136. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
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proposition that the LTD plan is a “bona fide benefit plan” by showing 
that the administrator of the plan is not undertaking the process of 
“underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administering such risks.”137 
Second, if plaintiffs can show that a “bona fide benefits plan” is a 
“subterfuge that evades the purposes” of the ADA, the court can still find 
that such disparate LTD plans are discriminatory under the ADA. 
Although courts have interpreted “subterfuge” in many ways,138 the 
Johnson court specifically interprets it to require that plaintiffs show that 
defendants had intent to evade the Act.139 While these attacks are 
admittedly difficult to make, they are part of an important balance struck 
by the Act that gives plaintiffs more ground than a rule that disparate 
LTD plans are simply not cognizable discrimination.140
C. Other Circuits’ Dismissal of the Application of Olmstead to Title I 
Though two other circuits have upheld disparate LTD plans since 
Olmstead was decided, both circuits dismissed Olmstead based on 
superficial factual distinctions without considering the change in the 
discrimination analysis, and instead relied heavily on arguments from 
 137. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c)(2). Although many courts have established an extremely low 
threshold for proving this point, see, e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 611–12 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (holding that there is no requirement that benefit plans or insurance show they are based 
on actuarial principles of classifying or underwriting risks); Piquard v. City of East Peoria, 887 F. 
Supp. 1106, 1120 (C.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that a benefits plan is “‘bona fide’ . . . if it ‘exists and 
pays benefits’”) (citations omitted), a few district courts have held that a defendant must show that 
the plan is based on sound actuarial principles, or actual or reasonably anticipated experience, see, 
e.g., Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 999 F. Supp. 1188, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1998), rev’d on other 
grounds, 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co., 964 F. Supp. 299, 304 (N.D. 
Cal. 1997). 
 138. Some courts create a nearly meaningless standard that simply restates other portions of 
the safe harbor provision, see Piquard, 887 F. Supp. at 1125 (holding that “the subterfuge sentence 
of [§ 12201(c)] means that a benefit plan disability-based distinction based on underwriting, 
classifying, or administering risks that is based on or not inconsistent with State law may not be used 
to discriminate in non-fringe-benefit areas of employment”), while other courts rely on the intent of 
the benefit plan administrator or developer, see Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 
678–79 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 139. Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 273 F.3d 1035, 1056–59 (11th Cir.) (panel), reh’g en banc 
granted, panel opinion vacated 273 F.3d at 1070 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 140. It is true that circuit courts addressed arguments under the safe harbor provision. See 
Rogers v. Dep’t of Health & Envt’l Control, 174 F.3d 431, 437 (4th Cir. 1999); Ford v. Schering-
Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 610–11 (3d Cir. 1998). These opinions, however, are odd because they 
both hold that disparate plans are not discrimination without referring to the safe harbor until 
addressing a plaintiff challenge under the subterfuge doctrine. This type of analysis lends itself 
easily to omitting the safe harbor provision altogether as some courts have done. See, e.g., Kimber v. 
Thiokol Corp., 196 F.3d 1092, 1101–02 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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prior case law that Olmstead refuted. Because the arguments made by 
other circuits have already been addressed, this section focuses on the 
new analysis in Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Corp. and EEOC v. 
Staten Island Savings Bank.141
1. Weyer v. Twentieth Century Fox Corp. 
In Weyer, the Ninth Circuit relied on other circuits for its ruling and 
inappropriately distinguished Olmstead on its facts. After citing previous 
case law and arguments similar to those made therein,142 Weyer 
addressed Olmstead directly. Weyer argued that “Olmstead d[id] not 
speak to insurance classifications . . . [, but] spoke to segregation of the 
 141. Recent cases, including Weyer and Staten Island Savings Bank, have claimed reliance 
upon the weight of previous case law, but there is not as much precedent as recent cases claim. The 
Second Circuit cites six other circuits as already having upheld disparate LTD plans, EEOC v. Staten 
Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir. 2000), when, in fact, only four of those six have 
addressed the issue. The Second Circuit cites the Sixth Circuit case, Parker v. Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1015 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc), which only considers whether a 
benefit plan provider can be considered a covered entity under Title III of the ADA, and the Seventh 
Circuit case, EEOC v. CNA Insurance Cos., 96 F.3d 1039, 1042–44 (7th Cir. 1996), which dismisses 
the suit because the plaintiff was a former employee and not eligible to file suit under the ADA. 
Neither case addressed whether disparate LTD plans amounted to discrimination under the ADA. 
Prior to this, the Ninth Circuit claimed that seven circuits had decided the issue, Weyer v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Corp., 198 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 2000), and cited Parker, CNA Insurance, and an 
Eighth Circuit case that merely addressed whether or not infertility could be considered a disability 
under the ADA. Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996). Part of the reason 
for such confusion among the circuits is that several circuits have either purposefully or 
inadvertently held that the plaintiff was not eligible to file suit under the ADA and then went on to 
address the substantive issue of whether or not discrimination had occurred. See Weyer, 198 F.3d at 
1116; CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d at 1043–45. The holdings thus mix the two issues together and make 
for misleading and confusing opinions. For example, CNA Insurance contains a great deal of 
language concerning the validity of disparate LTD plans under Title I, but the court dismissed the 
case based on the plaintiff’s ineligibility to sue. The remaining opinion is therefore dicta. See CNA 
Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d at 1043–45. It is arguable that in Weyer both issues were addressed because the 
plaintiff also filed suit under Title III, which has very different eligibility requirements; however, 
when defining the issue, the court specifically mentioned both Title I and Title III. 198 F.3d at 1116. 
In addition, Weyer found that the benefits plan did not meet the requisite standard of being a “public 
accommodation” under Title III. Id. at 1113–16. For purposes of this Note, the focus will be on the 
Title I analysis. 
 142. Weyer heavily cites CNA Insurance for the argument that since the same LTD plan was 
given to everyone and “[a]ll employees . . . had a plan that promised them long-term benefits from 
the onset of disability until age 65 if their problem was physical, and long-term benefits for two 
years if the problem was mental or nervous,” there could not be a claim for discrimination. Weyer, 
198 F.3d at 1116 (citing CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d at 1044). It is interesting to note that this language 
in CNA Insurance was merely dicta since the court had already dismissed the action because the 
plaintiff was not eligible to file suit under the ADA. See CNA Ins. Cos., 96 F.3d at 1045. Weyer also 
cited Rogers and Ford for their interpretive arguments and policy. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1116–17. 
These arguments have been presented previously. See supra Part II.D. 
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disabled through unwarranted institutional confinement,” and concluded 
that “[a]pplying Olmstead to insurance classifications would conflict 
with . . . Alexander v. Choate and Traynor v. Turnage, which both 
endorse distinctions between types of disabilities, and Congress’s clear 
instruction in the insurance safe harbor that the [ADA] was not intended 
to reach common insurance.”143
Weyer’s analysis contains several flaws. The factual distinction 
dismissing Olmstead is superficial. While Olmstead clearly deals with 
unnecessary institutionalization rather than LTD plans, Weyer fails to 
address the rule adopted in Olmstead that discrimination between 
individuals with disabilities, regardless of the types of disabilities, is 
prohibited discrimination under the ADA. Its reliance on Alexander and 
Traynor is inappropriate for two reasons. First, Olmstead directly 
interprets the provisions of the ADA, thereby making the Rehabilitation 
Act interpretation less important and even unnecessary in determining 
discrimination under the ADA. Second, the amended Rehabilitation Act 
is specifically required, by its own terms, to meet the standards of the 
ADA.144 Had Congress considered the Rehabilitation Act’s 
discrimination standards to be the same as the ADA’s, it would not have 
amended the Rehabilitation Act to account for the ADA discrimination 
standards. Finally, the use of the ADA safe harbor provision as 
narrowing the meaning of discrimination under the ADA disallows the 
full statutory effect of the safe harbor provision.145
2. EEOC v. Staten Island Savings Bank 
In Staten Island Savings Bank, the Second Circuit addressed 
Olmstead under a broader argument made by the plaintiff that the ADA 
was designed to protect on an individual basis and not merely on the 
basis of the protected class as a whole.146 The Second Circuit, however, 
declared that “the ADA’s ‘individualized focus’ d[id] not require [the 
court] to conclude that the ADA regulates the content of [LTDs],” but 
that the Act only requires that an individual’s “access to an employer’s 
fringe benefit program not be denied or limited on the basis of his or her 
 143. Weyer, 198 F.3d at 1117–18. 
 144. See supra note 127. 
 145. Note that the Rehabilitation Act interpreted in both Alexander and Traynor did not 
contain a safe harbor for insurance, and thus the Court needed to consider the ramifications of 
insurance distinctions when defining discrimination. Courts are no longer limited by those policy 
concerns. 
 146. Staten Island Sav. Bank, 207 F.3d at 151. 
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particular disability.”147 The Second Circuit’s argument, however, fails 
to account for the fact that plans that offer the same benefits to all 
participants can intentionally single out certain disabilities by offering 
very little or no coverage to certain disabilities based on the type of 
disability rather than types of treatments. An individual has been 
discriminated against if he or she becomes unable to work because of a 
mental disability, and is denied payments in lieu of a salary after a 
limited time period for no reason other than that the disability was 
mental. The type of denial individuals with mental disabilities face from 
disparate LTD plans is based solely on the fact that their disabilities are 
mental; those individuals do not enjoy access to disability coverage equal 
to that enjoyed by those with physical disabilities. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although the safe harbor provision will allow many disparate LTD 
and other benefit plans to be legally viable under the ADA, it is 
important that courts have a clear standard for determining 
discrimination that requires closer scrutiny of disparate LTD plans. Even 
more important is that the ADA be able to protect against those things 
specifically mentioned by Congress, including all types of “limiting, 
segregating, or classifying” disabled individuals in ways “that adversely 
affect[] [their] opportunities or status.”148 With these important 
principles in mind, the Eleventh Circuit succeeded in developing an 
analysis that will properly account for all types of discrimination meant 
to be addressed by the ADA without overburdening the insurance 




 147. Id. 
 148. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (2000). Other Congressional findings include those 
provisions which concerned the Olmstead court, see supra note 100, and other specific examples of 
discrimination, see supra Part II.B. 
